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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-3453
ABRAO DEALMEIDA,
Petitioner, 
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL
 OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
U.S. Department of Justice
BIA File No. A25-307-918
Submitted Pursuant to LAR 34.1(a) 
 June 14, 2007
BEFORE McKEE, STAPLETON, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 18, 2007)
___________________
OPINION
___________________
McKEE, Circuit Judge,
Abrao DeAlmeida petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
2Appeals reversing the Immigration Judge’s grant of relief under  the United Nations
Convention Against Torture  (“CAT”).  For reasons stated below, we will deny the
petition.  
I.
Since we write primarily for the parties, we need not reiterate the factual or
procedural history of this appeal except insofar as may be helpful to our brief discussion.
Abrao DeAlmeida was born in a Botswana refugee camp.  His parents had taken
refuge there after civil war forced them to flee their native Angola.  DeAlmeida’s family
eventually  relocated to the United States and DeAlmeida became a lawful permanent
resident.  However, his residency here was not without difficulties as he was subsequently
convicted of possession of heroin with intent to deliver.  Relying upon that conviction, the
Government initiated removal proceedings against him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as his conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under immigration
law.
At the ensuing immigration hearing, the Immigration Judge denied  DeAlmeida’s
request for withholding of removal, but granted relief under the CAT.  The IJ based his
decision primarily on the widespread torture and human rights violations still occurring in
Angola.  The IJ found that arbitrary arrest and detention are common in Angola, and that
detainees and prisoners are subjected to torture.   That finding, combined  with the fact
that DeAlmeida had never lived in Angola, caused the IJ to conclude that DeAlmeida
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(d) because DeAlmeida asserts a1
due process claim, and also argues that the BIA committed legal error in applying the CAT.  We
exercise de novo review over the BIA’s legal determinations, but afford Chevron deference to the
BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the statutes the BIA is charged with administering. Francois v.
Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 2006).
 DeAlmeida argues: “the Board failed to provide due process in the adjudication of his2
claims arising under the Convention Against Torture. . . .  the Board failed to refute the
3
would be detained and tortured if he returned, and that he was therefore eligible for CAT
relief.
The BIA sustained the Government’s appeal because the Board found that the IJ’s 
conclusion that DeAlmeida would likely face detention and torture upon return to Angola
was “speculative” and “unconvincing.”  The BIA concluded that the evidence did not
satisfy DeAlmeida’s burden under the CAT and ordered him removed to Angola. This
petition for review followed.1
II.
The Government argues that we lack jurisdiction over DeAlmeida’s petition for
review because the only claim that has not been waived is nothing more than a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Respondent’s Br. at 4.  We agree that DeAlmeida
did not preserve his claim that he is not a citizen of Angola, or the claim that he cannot be
removed unless his refugee status is first revoked.  Although the Government believes
that DeAlmeida‘s remaining claim raises only a factual dispute,  DeAlmeida is arguing
that the Board’s treatment of the IJ’s decision denied him due process of law, and that the
Board erred in applying the CAT.   See Cham v. Att’y  Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 691 (3d Cir.2
Petitioner’s evidence, but merely stated, in boilerplate form, that the Petitioner failed to meet his
burden of proof.  The Board did not specify what about the available evidence contradicted the
Petitioner’s claim. The Board’s decision was also erroneous because it found no error in the
factual determinations made by the immigration  judge but merely asserted that the judge’s legal
conclusions were ‘speculative’ and unsupported by the evidence.  The Board did not specify why
it made that determination.”  Petitioner’s Br. at 24.  
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2006).   We have jurisdiction over those claims. 
Aliens in removal proceedings are entitled to due process. See Sewak v. INS, 900
F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1990).  Due process guarantees “factfinding based on a record
produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to [the alien],” the right to make
“arguments on [the alien’s] own behalf,” and “the right to an individualized determination
of [the alien’s] interests.” Kamara v. Atty. Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 212 (3d Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly, “the question of due process is not
whether the BIA reached the correct decision; rather it is simply whether the Board made
an individualized determination of [the alien’s]” claim. Id. See also Awolesi v. Ashcroft,
341 F.3d 227, 232n.7 (3d cir. 2003).  
The BIA found that the undisputed facts in the record did not satisfy the standard
for CAT relief, and that the IJ’s contrary conclusion was not supported by objective
evidence.  Despite DeAlmeida’s concern with the brevity of the Board’s decision, the
Board’s factual conclusions, and the Board’s rejection of the IJ’s conclusions, it is clear
that the Board afforded DeAlmeida an “individualized  determination” of his claim for
relief under the CAT.  Accordingly, there is no due process violation. The BIA found that
the record did not satisfy the legal standard for CAT relief, and that the IJ’s contrary
The Assessment cites two documents for this proposition, the “Bakongo Brief - January3
1998" and a document from the UN Integrated Regional Information Network entitled “UNITA
General Seek Asylum, 10/06/00,” neither of which is part of the administrative record.
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conclusion was based on speculation that was not supported by objective evidence.   
 We find no legal error in the BIA’s conclusion that the IJ’s grant of CAT relief
was based on speculative legal conclusions that are unsupported by objective evidence. 
Indeed, the IJ made an assumption that rests on nothing more than general evidence of
Angola’s poor human rights record and arbitrary arrests and detentions.  Based upon that,
the IJ concluded that Angolan authorities will likely detain DeAlmeida for some extended
period of time on account of his status as a criminal deportee who has never before lived
in the country.  The IJ made this finding despite conceding that there is “no direct
evidence concerning the Angolan government’s policies or practices” regarding the
detention of criminal deportees in the administrative record.  App. at 46.  
Our independent review of the record did uncover a single document, entitled
“Angola Assessment,” prepared by a United Kingdom immigration agency in April 2002,
which has at least marginal relevance to this aspect of DeAlmeida’s claim.  That
assessment provides in pertinent part: “Any Angolans who have been deported from
abroad, or who lived abroad for many years, would be questioned by immigration and
police at the airport with a view to establishing their identity and whether they were of
interest to the authorities for political or criminal reasons.  The fact of applying for
asylum would not, if discovered, be of particular interest.”  App. at 287.   However, this3
DeAlmeida did testify that he knew one Angolan who had been deported for a criminal4
conviction over ten years ago, and that rebels associated with  UNITA tried to torture him
because they considered him to be a traitor.  App. at 113-15; 121.  But there was no suggestion
that this deportee was targeted by UNITA rebels because of his status as a criminal deportee. 
The IJ rejected DeAlmeida’s claims for relief that were based on his fear of torture by UNITA
rebels in view of the changed political climate in Angola. 
 As noted earlier, DeAlmeida has not preserved his argument that he is not an Angolan5
citizen.  We note, however, that the Government argues without contradiction that DeAlmeida
conceded Angolan citizenship in the brief he submitted to the IJ, his argument before the IJ, and
in his Asylum Application. See Respondent’s Br. at 7 n.3.
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only establishes that DeAlmeida will be questioned by Angolan officials upon his arrival.  
It does not establish a likelihood that he will be imprisoned or tortured. 
Moreover, although DeAlmeida originally stated in his application for relief that
he feared detention and torture by Angolan authorities on account of his status as a
criminal deportee, App. at 390, he testified at the hearing that he only feared removal to
Angola because he had never lived there before and because of his father’s military
background, App. at 124, not because of any fear of detention or torture based on his
status of criminal deportee.   In any event, the lack of objective evidence of detention of4
criminal deportees is fatal to DeAlmeida’s CAT claim.   5
III
For the reasons stated above, the petition is denied.
